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Abstract
The purchasing power parity puzzle relates to the adjustment of real exchange rates.  Real
exchange rates are extremely volatile, suggesting that temporary shocks emanate from the monetary
sector.  But the half-life of real exchange rate deviations is extremely large – 2.5 to 5 years.  This half-
life seems too large to be explained by the slow adjustment of nominal prices.  We offer a different
interpretation.  We maintain that nominal exchange rates and prices need not converge at the same rate,
as is implicit in rational-expectations sticky-price models of the exchange rate.  Evidence from
unobserved components models for nominal prices and nominal exchange rates that impose relative
purchasing power parity in the long run indicates that nominal exchange rates converge much more
slowly than nominal prices.  The real puzzle is why nominal exchange rates converge so slowly.
Engel acknowledges research support from a National Science Foundation grant to the National
Bureau of Economic Research.1
Since the advent of floating exchange rates in 1973, real exchange rates among
industrialized countries have been very persistent and much more volatile than
economists predicted.  There are two general classes of explanations for this outcome, but
neither is entirely satisfactory.  It is possible that real productivity shocks and real
demand shocks to economies have been very persistent.  But it is difficult to identify
shocks that would lead to such great volatility of real exchange rates.
A second view builds on rational-expectations sticky-price (RESP) models of
open economy in the tradition of Dornbusch (1976).  Those models demonstrate that
monetary shocks could lead to a high degree of real exchange rate volatility through the
overshooting effect.  Moreover, real exchange rates might be persistent because they
adjust at the same rate as nominal prices adjust.
However, empirical studies of real exchange rate adjustment have found very long
half-lives for transitory shocks to real exchange rates.  Typically, the half-life of real
exchange rates is estimated to be from 2.5 to 5 years.
1  That adjustment seems to be too
slow to be explained by stickiness of nominal prices.   Hence, we have the “purchasing
power parity puzzle”, as defined by Rogoff (1996):
How can one reconcile the enormous short-term volatility of real exchange rates
with the extremely slow rate at which shocks appear to damp out?  Most explanations of
short-term exchange rate volatility point to financial factors such as changes in portfolio
preferences, short-term asset price bubbles, and monetary shocks.  Such shocks can have
substantial effects on the real economy in the presence of sticky nominal wages and
prices.  Consensus estimates for the rate at which PPP deviations damp, however, suggest
a half-life of three to five years, seemingly far too long to be explained by nominal
rigidities.  It is not difficult to rationalize slow adjustment if real shocks – shocks to tastes
and technology – are predominant.  But existing models based on real shocks cannot
account for short-term exchange-rate volatility.  (pp.  647-648.)
                                               
1 See for example Frankel (1986), Lothian and Taylor (1996), Wu (1996), Papell (1997), Cheung and Lai
(2000) and Murray and Papell (2000).2
Earlier, Stockman (1984) also questions whether the slow convergence of real
exchange rates can be explained by slow adjustment of nominal prices:
…This degree of persistence appears to be too large to explain on the basis of
disequilibrium models that postulate sticky nominal prices.  Many macroeconomists
believe that sticky nominal prices play a major role in business cycles (though there is
clearly controversies about this.)  The length of time over which the economy recovers
from recessions would provide a rough estimate of the time it takes the overall price level
to adjust to its new equilibrium following a disturbance.  This estimate would suggest a
period of two to three years.  In fact, because there are many reasons for business cycles
to persist once they have begun, two to three years is probably an upper bound.
Disequilibrium theories of exchange rates, based on sticky nominal goods prices, predict
that real and nominal exchange rates should return toward their equilibrium levels when
nominal goods prices do.  This means that they predict systematic changes in real and
nominal exchange rates that are not found in the data.
Here we offer one possible resolution to the purchasing power parity puzzle:
nominal prices and exchange rates converge at different speeds.  In fact, we find prices
converge relatively rapidly.  It is nominal exchange rates that move toward the
purchasing power parity equilibrium very slowly.  Why do Rogoff, Stockman and others
mate the convergence speed of the real exchange rate with the convergence speed of
prices?  Probably it is because that is the sort of dynamics that arise from RESP models.
In those models,  prices, nominal exchange rates, and real exchange rates converge to the
long run at the same rate.  Such models restrict the dimension of deviations of exchange
rates and prices from their long-run equilibrium values.  These variables converge along a
saddle path, which makes the deviation of the nominal exchange rate a linear
combination of the deviation of domestic and foreign prices from their equilibrium
values.
We raise a new puzzle: why does the nominal exchange rate converge so slowly?
We do not provide an alternative theory that can explain why nominal exchange rates3
deviate from their long-run equilibrium value for such long periods of time.  The model
we present is empirical.  Perhaps this new puzzle is related to the empirical failure of
uncovered interest parity (UIP).  In terms of the RESP model, the forward-looking
behavior implicit in rational expectations modeling of the UIP condition is the key to the
solution that puts exchange rates and prices on a saddle path, and reduces the
dimensionality of the system.  However, we do not attempt any theoretical modeling of
an alternative to UIP.  The UIP puzzle has been very resistant to theoretical explanations,
so we leave that for future research.
2
In section 1, we lay out the empirical model.  Section 2 relates the model to RESP
model directly, as a way to develop some restrictions that are helpful in estimation.  (We
build a model that nests a RESP model as a special case.)  Section 3 reports results.
Section 4 explores what happens when we relax the restrictions used in estimation.
Section 5 compares our approach to other recent studies that have allowed different
speeds of adjustment for exchange rates and prices.  In section 6, we speculate on what
type of economic behavior might produce the results we find.
1. Model
We propose an unobserved components (UC) model to examine price level and
exchange rate adjustment. In our model, the log price levels and the log nominal
exchange rate for a given pair of countries are subject to permanent and transitory shocks,
but gravitate over time toward an unobserved equilibrium based on purchasing power
parity (PPP).
                                               
2  See Hodrick (1987) and Engel (1996) for extensive surveys.4
In its most general form, our model has the observed log price levels and the log
exchange rate adjust toward unobserved equilibrium values according to kth-order
stationary autoregressive processes:
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t p  represents the foreign price level, and  t s  represents the nominal
exchange rate expressed as the price of the foreign currency in domestic currency units;
t p , 
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t p , and  t s  represent the corresponding equilibrium values; and  t v , 
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t v , and 
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represent transitory shocks to domestic price level, foreign price level, and the exchange
rate, respectively.  Meanwhile, the first differences of the unobserved equilibrium log
price levels adjust according to kth-order autoregressive processes: 
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domestic and foreign price levels, respectively.  The equilibrium exchange rate relates to5
equilibrium price levels according to PPP:
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Equations (1) and (2) are price-adjustment equations.  These might be considered
structural equations that describe how an aggregate price index adjusts to its long-run
equilibrium.  These equations are very similar to price-adjustment equations in open-
economy models presented by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1984) and Engel and Frankel (1984).
The equilibrium prices,  t p  and 
*
t p , are interpreted in those models as the price level that
would prevail in each country if prices were perfectly flexible, given the current values
(and history) of the exogenous variables.
Under this interpretation, equations (4) and (5) describe what the evolution of  t p
and 
*
t p  would be if prices were perfectly flexible.  Nominal prices are determined by the
dynamics of money supply and money demand.  Our model incorporates a unit root in
these equilibrium prices, but does not require that they follow a random walk.  For
example, with fixed money demand, nominal prices could follow such a process if money
supplies were exogenously generated as unit root processes.
Equation (6) imposes long-run purchasing power parity.  Rogoff (1997) claims
there is a growing consensus on this empirical regularity (however, see Engel (2000)).6
Equation (3) indicates there are transitory deviations from purchasing power parity.
It is easy to relate this model to stochastic versions of the RESP model.  In section
2 we discuss the relationship in detail.  It is useful now to point out the main contrast
between this model and the RESP models: those models have  ) (L p f ,  ) (L
p
* f , and  ) (L s f
the same.
2. Estimation
To make estimation more tractable, we place three major restrictions on the
general model presented in the previous section.  First, for simplicity and transparency,
we assume first-order autoregressive adjustment processes (i.e.,  1 = k ).  Second, we
impose some zero restrictions, discussed below, on the covariance matrix of the
permanent and transitory shocks.  Third, since our main focus is on the difference
between the speeds of adjustment for nominal prices and for nominal exchange rates, we
impose that nominal prices adjust at the same speed in each country (i.e.,  * =
p p f f  and
* =
p p f f ) and, also as discussed below, that the relationship between shocks is
proportional across countries.  In section 4, we explore what happens when we relax
these restrictions.
The standard approach to restricting the covariance matrix is to assume that all of
the underlying shocks are independent.  It turns out, however, that such a strong
assumption is not necessary to identify the model. Furthermore, independence would
have the drawback of not nesting RESP-style dynamics. Appendix 1 presents a RESP
model, and discusses the restrictions imposed by that model. In this section, we discuss7
those restrictions more informally and describe how they are accommodated in our
estimation.
Consider equations (1) and (4), the price-adjustment equation for domestic prices
and the equation determining the dynamics of equilibrium prices in the home country.  In
the RESP model, monetary and fiscal shocks move the equilibrium price level.  The
shock in equation (4),  t v , can be considered a linear combination of the shocks that affect
equilibrium nominal prices.  Under the assumption of independent shocks, the error term
in the price-adjustment equation (1),  t v , would not be correlated with  t v .  The
implication is that any shock that pushes up  t p  would push  t p  up immediately by
exactly the same amount.  In equation (1), shocks to  t v  determine the gap  t t p p - , but  t v
shocks have no effect on this gap unless  t v  is correlated with  t v .
But this kind of immediate proportional response of prices,  t p , to shocks that
affect equilibrium prices,  t p , is completely inconsistent with the price-stickiness
assumptions of RESP models.  In terms of our model, RESP models have negative
correlation between  t v  and  t v .  Indeed, a literal representation of predetermined nominal
prices has these terms perfectly negatively correlated:   t t v v - = .  Under this assumption,
the price adjustment equation (1) can be written as:
t t t t p t p E p p L p 1 ) ))( ( 1 ( - + - - = f .
In practice, there are a couple of reasons to assume that while  t v  and  t v  might be
negatively correlated, the correlation is not perfect.  The assumption of perfect negative
correlation means that prices do not respond at all in the current period to shocks that8
affect  t p .  That is an impractical assumption in our empirical model.  Our price data are
sampled quarterly, so the assumption means that even after one full quarter prices show
no response to  t v  shocks.  We find in our empirical work that prices actually adjust fairly
quickly – generally more than half of the adjustment occurs within six months.  Even if
prices do not respond on impact to  t v  shocks, we should allow for the possibility that
some of the adjustment occurs within the first quarter.  So, we want to allow for negative
correlation of  t v  and  t v  so that we have some sluggishness in the response of prices, but
we do not want to impose perfect negative correlation which would require no response
of prices after a full quarter.
Another reason to allow less than perfect negative correlation of  t v  and  t v  is that
there may be some shocks to the price-adjustment process that are not perfectly
correlated with the underlying permanent shocks to  t p .  For example,  t v  is a linear
combination of a variety of demand shocks that could hit the economy.  Not all prices
adjust at the same speed.  So, consider two different shocks to  t v .  They might affect
individual prices of goods differentially.  Monetary shocks might have larger effects on
food prices, while fiscal shocks may have larger effects on housing prices.  Two shocks
that end up having identical effects on  t v  may imply different speeds of adjustment for
the aggregate price level because housing and food prices adjust at different speeds.  So,
the  t v  shock might incorporate these composition effects on the speed of adjustment
which are separate from the impact of the aggregate nominal shock,  t v .
Appendix 1 presents price-adjustment equations that incorporate these features.9
We accommodate them in our estimation by allowing for non-zero values of  p p, s  and
* * p p , s .
Another instance in which it is important not to assume independence of shocks is
with the shocks to the exchange rate and to  t p  and 
*
t p .  A key feature of the RESP
model is that exchange rates instantaneously reflect shocks that ultimately are reflected in
goods prices.  Monetary and other demand shocks that affect  t p  and 
*
t p  also affect  t s .
Of course there is no restriction that the exchange rate move the same amount as  t p  and
*
t p .  There may be overshooting or undershooting.  But, to accommodate this behaviour,
we also allow for non-zero values of  p s, s  and  * p s, s .
Then, since the shocks to the exchange rate equation, 
s
t v , and the shocks to prices,
t v  and 
*
t v , are correlated with the shocks to equilibrium prices,  t v  and 
*
t v , it is logical to
allow 
s
t v  to be correlated with  t v  and 
*
t v .  So, we also allow  p s, s  and  * p s, s  to be non-
zero.
Meanwhile, we assume that  t v  and  t v  are uncorrelated with 
*
t v  and 
*
t v .  This is a
typical assumption in RESP models.  It corresponds to an assumption that domestic
monetary and fiscal shocks are uncorrelated with the corresponding foreign shocks.
Our model generalizes the models of Mussa (1982), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1984)
and Engel and Frankel (1984) in two ways.  The first is relatively trivial.  As we
discussed above, we do not impose the restriction that shocks to current and equilibrium
prices in each country are perfectly negatively correlated.  The second is crucial.  The10
two-country model yields saddle-path dynamics in which prices and the exchange rate
converge at the same speed.  It has a linear restriction of the form:
) ( ) (
* * *
t t t t t t p p p p s s - + - - = - h h , (8)
where h  and 
* h  are constants.  We do not impose such a restriction.  Furthermore, the
symmetric model implies 
* h h = .  That is, it yields the restriction that  ) (L p f ,  ) (L p
* f ,
and  ) (L s f  are the same.  We do not impose that restriction. Instead, we allow prices to
have one speed of convergence and the exchange rate to have another.  Indeed, it is by
jettisoning the restriction that  ) (L p f ,  ) (L
p
* f , and  ) (L s f  are all the same that we move
from a model in which we can speak meaningfully about the speed of adjustment of the
real exchange rate to a model that focuses on the speed of adjustment of nominal prices
and nominal exchange rates.
In light of the above discussion, we impose only four independent zero
restrictions on the covariance matrix, instead of nine, as in the case when all of the shocks
are independent.  Thus, the joint Normal distribution for the permanent and transitory
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In addition to these four zero restrictions, we consider three proportionality
restrictions for the non-zero off-diagonal elements of the covariance matrix.  These
proportionality restrictions hold for the symmetric RESP model, discussed in the
appendix, and might well be expected to hold for our model given the assumption that
nominal prices adjust at the same speed in each country.
The first proportionality restriction we impose is that, while the direction is
opposite, the degree of exchange overshooting or undershooting should be the same in
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The second restriction we impose is that the relationship between permanent and
transitory price shocks is proportional in each country:
2
, p p p ds s - = , (10a)
2
,
* * * - =
p p p ds s , (10b)
where if  1 = d , we would have the perfect price-stickiness case mentioned above. The
third restriction is that the relationship between transitory price shocks and transitory
exchange shocks is proportional with opposite signs in each country:
2




p p s ks s . (11b)
With the three additional proportionality restrictions, we limit the number of independent
elements in (7¢) from eleven to eight.12
It is important to emphasize that the restrictions on the covariance matrix are not
necessary to identify our model.  Given  1 = k , the structural UC model in (1)-(7)
corresponds to a reduced-form model with enough parameters for identification.
3  In
particular, the most general structural model has 22 parameters (excluding the
normalizing initial values for the unobserved permanent components, which cannot be
identified from a reduced-form model in first differences alone). Meanwhile, the same
structural model implies that the first differences of the price levels and the exchange rate
have reduced-form univariate ARMA(2,2) and ARMA(3,3) representations, which
corresponds to 22 independent parameters.
4  Difficulties can arise in practice when
certain autoregressive roots are similar and cancel each other out.  The subsequent
reduction in the dimension of the structural model can correspond to an even larger
reduction in the dimension of the reduced-form model.  Thus, the restrictions imposed
here may be helpful in estimation.
5 However, in section 4, we explore what happens
when we relax these restrictions.
Appendix 2 discusses the Kalman filter and maximum likelihood estimation of this
model.
3. Results
We consider six country pairs based on the G7 countries, with the US always
serving as the home country. The foreign country is represented by Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, and the UK, respectively. We employ price level and exchange
                                               
3 See Morley, Nelson, and Zivot (1999) for a discussion of identification of non-zero covariances in a UC
model.
4 Our structural model implies only two independent constants in the reduced-form model.13
rate data from Datastream.  The price levels for the home and foreign countries are
represented by their respective consumer price indexes (not seasonally adjusted).  The
exchange rates are end-of-period prices of foreign currency expressed in US dollars.  The
original data are sampled at a monthly frequency. However, we sample the data at a
quarterly frequency to simplify estimation.  The data are converted into logarithms and
multiplied by 100. The sample period is 1974Q1 to 1998Q2.
We employ the OPTMUM procedure for the GAUSS programming language to
obtain maximum likelihood estimates.  Numerical derivatives are used for estimation and
the calculation of asymptotic standard errors.  Estimates appear robust to a variety of
starting values.
Table 1 presents the maximum likelihood estimates for our model and the country
pairs a) US and Canada, b) US and France, c) US and Germany, d) US and Italy, e) US
and Japan, and f) US and UK, respectively.  The most important thing to notice about
these estimates is that, for every country pair, the adjustment of prices to a transitory
shock is much faster than the adjustment of the exchange rate.  The half-lives of
transitory price shocks are less than a quarter in the first three cases and less than two
quarters in the remaining three cases.  Meanwhile, the half-lives of transitory exchange
rate shocks range from two years for the US/UK case, to as many as thirteen years for the
US/Canada case.
Another notable result is that equilibrium inflation is very persistent for every
country pair.  Indeed, it seems unlikely that we would be able to reject a unit root in
equilibrium inflation in any of the cases.  However, if a unit root really were present,
                                                                                                                                           
5 It appears that, as the number of restrictions is reduced, the more sensitive estimates become to starting
values.14
accounting for it should only serve to strengthen evidence for fast adjustment of prices in
response to transitory shocks.  In particular, an ommitted nonstationary component from
equilibrium prices would show up in the estimated gap between prices and equilibrium
prices, thus putting an upward bias on our estimates of the persistence of transitory price
shocks. We explore a related phenomenon in the next section when we allow for a one-
time structural break in the equilibrium inflation process.
The next result to notice is that the transitory exchange rate shocks are an order of
magnitude more volatile than the permanent and transitory price shocks.  This is not too
surprising given the relative volatility of observed prices and exchange rates, which is the
main stylized fact RESP overshooting models try to account for.  But, it is notable since it
potentially explains why Cheung, Lai, and Bergman (1999) find that nominal exchange
rates do most of the adjustment towards PPP, even if prices adjust more quickly.  We
discuss this point in further detail in section 5.
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p p s p p s s s s s g  generally imply overshooting of exchange rates in response to
permanent price shocks.  In particular, the exchange rate appears to overshoot a
permanent price shock by 570% in the US/France case, 230% in the US/Germany case,
300% in the US/Italy case, and 730% in the US/Japan case.  The exchange rate does
appear to undershoot by 70% in the US/Canada case and 65% in the US/UK case,
although, even in these cases, the exchange rates still moves in the “correct” direction.
However, it should be noted that the undershooting and overshooting estimates are not
significant at conventional levels.15
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p p p p p p s s s s d  are always negative, except in the US/Canada
case.  Furthermore, these estimates are always significant. Negative estimates of d
correspond to a positive correlation between permanent and transitory price shocks.  This
finding could be a result of prices actually overshooting in response to permanent price
shocks.  A more plausible story, though, is that the causality runs the other way, with
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p p s p p s s s s s k  appear to confirm this latter interpretation since they are
always positive, except again in the US/Canada case.  Positive estimates correspond to
co-movement of the price gap and the exchange rate gap that is typically opposite to what
would be implied by joint overshooting.  Instead, the co-movement is more consistent
with a situation in which exchange rates do not respond to temporary accommodation of
supply shocks.  Of course, we should be careful about interpreting the estimates of k  too
literally since they are not significant.
The remaining estimates in Table 1 are of the long-run inflation rates in each
country and the normalizing initial values for the unobserved equilibrium prices and
exchange rate.  It is encouraging to note that the estimates for all of the parameters
associated with US prices only (i.e.,  1 , , - p p m s ) are robust across all country pairs. The
speed of adjustment parameters for US prices are different across country pairs since they
are constrained to equal the speed of adjustment parameters for foreign prices, which are
evidently somewhat different for each country under consideration.
Table 2 presents the results for a formal likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that16
prices and the exchange rate adjust at the same speed against the alternative of different
speeds of adjustment.  Except for the US/Italy and US/Japan cases, the likelihood ratio
statistics are quite large, suggesting that the overall evidence for different speeds of
adjustment is strong.  Thus, the results for the likelihood ratio test generally support what
the point estimates seem to suggest: prices adjust more quickly than exchange rates.
4. Specification Tests
In this section, we explore what happens when we relax the restrictions imposed
on our model in estimation.  We also test the robustness of our main findings to other
model specifications.
Table 3 reports the results for a likelihood ratio test of our assumption of first-
order autoregressive adjustment processes (i.e., k =1) against the alternative of second-
order autoregressive adjustment processes (i.e., k = 2 ). The second-order dynamics are
uniformly significant, with c
2 3 ( ) likelihood ratio statistics ranging from 23.102 for the
US/France case to 49.728 for the US/Germany case. Of course, the apparent inability of
the restricted model to capture all of the serial correlation of permanent and transitory
price and exchange rate movements begs the question of whether the main finding of
different speeds of adjustment is spurious. Table 4 reports the results given second-order
adjustment processes for a likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that prices and the
exchange rate adjust at the same speed against the alternative of different speeds of
adjustment. Compared to Table 2, the hypothesis of the same speed of adjustment can be
more strongly rejected. Indeed, the point estimates for the AR(2) parameters generally17
suggest exchange rate adjustment that is as slow as in the AR(1) case, but price
adjustment that is much faster, with prices actually displaying a negative partial
autocorrelation at the second lag that is so large as to be more consistent with price
overshooting than price stickiness.
Table 5 reports the results for a likelihood ratio test of the four independent zero
restrictions in the covariance matrix (7’) against the alternative of no zero restrictions.
Since we do not impose the proportionality restrictions for this test, we also do not
impose that nominal prices adjust at the same speed in each country. The c
2 4 ( )
likelihood ratio statistics are all significant, suggesting that our zero restrictions can be
statistically rejected. However, we note that relaxing these restrictions makes estimation
much more sensitive to starting values, with the likelihood surface providing multiple
local maxima. Table 6 reports the results given no zero restrictions on the covariance
matrix (7) for a likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that prices and the exchange rate
adjust at the same speed against the alternative of different speeds of adjustment.
Compared to Tables 2 and 4, the results are weaker, although the  c
2 2 ( )  statistics are still
significant for the US/France case and the US/Germany case. We note that there appears
to be no pattern as to which individual elements of the covariance matrix are significant
across country pairs. Thus, we argue that the zero restrictions in (7’) are reasonable on
economic grounds (see the discussion in section 2).
Table 7 reports the results for a likelihood ratio test of the various symmetry
restrictions (same speed of adjustment for nominal prices and proportionality restrictions
on (7’)) against the alternative of no symmetry restrictions. The  c
2 5 ( )  likelihood ratio18
statistics are generally not significant. Only the US/Japan case is significant at the 10%
level. Both the same speed of adjustment restriction and the proportionality restrictions
are insignificant when tested for separately. Thus, the symmetry restrictions in our model
appear to be justified, with estimates changing little when the restrictions are relaxed.
Table 8 reports the results for a likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that all the
shocks are independent against the alternative that the shocks have the covariance
structure imposed in our model and given by (7’) and (9)-(11).  The  c
2 3 ( ) likelihood
ratio statistics are not significant at conventional levels. Thus, we should probably not put
too much emphasis on our interpretation of a , d , and k  in the previous section. Again,
however, we consider a model that allows non-zero elements in the covariance matrix to
accommodate the possibility of RESP-style dynamics.
[Other specifications to be considered include i) allowing for a one-time structural
break in 1980 in the unconditional means of the equilibrium inflation rates and ii)
allowing for the possibility that prices adjust to disequilibrium in the nominal exchange
rate by including the lagged exchange rate gap in the price adjustment equations.]
5. Discussion
It is notable that our main finding that prices adjust more quickly than exchange
rates appears to contradict the results of other related studies.  In this section, we discuss
why in particular our findings appear so different to the vector error correction model
(VECM) results reported in Cheung, Lai, and Bergman (1999).  In the next section, we
conclude by speculating on what type of economic behaviour might produce our results.19
To understand Cheung, Lai, and Bergman’s (1999) results, consider the following
VECM for relative prices  ) (
* - t t p p  and the exchange rate  t s :
p
t t t t p t t t t u p p s p p p p 1 1 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( +
* * *
+ + + + - = - - - a , (12)
s
t t t t s t t u p p s s s 1 1 ) ( +
*
+ + + - = - a , (13)
where  p a  and  s a  are error correction coefficients and 
p
t u  and 
s
t u  are stationary
residuals.
6  Cheung, Lai, and Bergman find that  s a  is always much larger in magnitude
than  p a .  That is, exchange rates adjust much more than relative prices in response to a
deviation from PPP.  Thus, Cheung, Lai, and Bergman conclude that “exchange rates
actually adjust faster than prices.”
How do we reconcile the VECM results with our findings?  We argue that Cheung,
Lai, and Bergman incorrectly interpret the coefficients  s a  and  p a  as relating to speeds of
adjustment.  The speed of adjustment is a measure of how fast a variable returns to some
equilibrium.  Thus, in the traditional PPP literature, the real exchange rate is assumed to
converge to some constant level, q , in the long run.  We can measure the speed of
adjustment by determining how much of the gap  q qt -  is carried through to the next
period in  q qt - +1 .  In our model, we look at speeds of adjustment for  t p , 
*
t p , and  t s
individually.  For example, the speed of adjustment for the nominal exchange rate is
measured by the degree to which  1 1 + + - t t s s  has adjusted to the gap  t t s s - .
                                               
6 Note that a finite-order VECM can only approximate the dynamics of the infinite-order vector MA
representation that corresponds to our UC model of prices and the exchange rate.20
Cheung, Lai, and Bergman do not measure speeds of adjustment.  For example, the
parameter  p a  is a measure of how relative inflation,  ) (
* *
1 1 t t t t p p p p - - - + + , responds to
the real exchange rate gap,  q qt - .  (We can rewrite equations (12) and (13) so that the
error correction term can be written as  q qt - .)  That may be an interesting parameter,
but it is difficult to see how to interpret it as relating to a speed of adjustment of prices.
To understand why their  p a  is so low, we point out two crucial differences in our
UC model and the VECM model.  First, the error correction term  in (12) and (13) is not
the same as the exchange rate gap  ) ( t t s s -  or the relative price gap  ) (
* - - t t t p p s
implicit in our UC representation of prices and the exchange rate, but is, instead, equal to
their difference.  So, our UC representation has prices adjusting only to the relative price
gap, while the ECM representation imposes that prices adjust equally to both gaps.  One
reason the coefficient  p a  is so low is that it measures the response of prices to a very
large gap,  q qt - , while we measure the response of prices to the smaller gaps,   t t p p -
and 
* *
t t p p - .  Our measures capture how quickly prices are adjusting to their deviation
from equilibrium, while the ECM parameter measures how much prices are responding to
the price gap and the exchange-rate gap.
An example makes this clear.  If relative prices follow a random walk, then by
construction they would adjust to equilibrium instantaneously.  There would be no
relative price gap, only an exchange rate gap.  However, since relative prices follow a
random walk, they would not adjust toward the exchange rate gap at all, implying that
p a  would actually be zero.
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Another way to think about the VECM results is to make the careful distinction
between the “size” of adjustment and the “speed” of adjustment to equilibrium.  The fact
that exchange rates adjust much more than relative prices in response to deviations to
PPP does not necessarily imply that exchange rates adjust more rapidly to equilibrium.
Instead, it appears from our findings that the main reason exchange rates adjust more than
relative prices is because the exchange rate gap is much larger than the relative price gap.
Specifically, we find transitory exchange rate shocks are always an order of magnitude
more volatile than transitory price shocks.  The best way to distinguish between the size
of adjustment and the speed of adjustment, then, is to control for the size of the gaps by
considering half-lives of any given one standard deviation transitory shock to the
exchange rate or prices. Our estimates of the half-lives make it clear that prices adjust
more quickly than the exchange rate.
A second difference between our UC modeling approach and the VECM approach
concerns the left-hand-side variable. Consider, for example, the nominal exchange rate.
In our UC model, we examine changes in the exchange rate relative to its equilibrium
value:  ) ( 1 1 t t t t s s s s - - - + + .  The left-hand-side variable in the VECM approach is simply
t t s s - +1 .  It is, of course, an empirical question as to which modeling approach fits the
data the best.
7  Our approach is easier to understand as a generalization of the RESP
model, and it is easier to infer the “speed of adjustment” from our parameter estimates.
Thus, when one considers that the error correction term mixes exchange rate and
price gaps or, alternatively, when one carefully distinguishes between the “size” and the
                                               
7   However, the two models are not easily nested in a more general model.  Model comparison based, for
example, on out-of-sample forecasting ability would be one approach to compare the models, but is beyond
the scope of this paper.22
“speed” of adjustment, it becomes clear that our main findings do not contradict Cheung,
Lai, and Bergman’s (1999) results. Our approach emphasizes the speed of adjustment to
unobserved equilibrium levels.
6. Conclusions
What could explain the result that prices converge fairly quickly in each country
to their equilibrium levels, but the exchange rate moves only very slowly to the PPP
value?  Rogoff’s (1997) speculation is apropos:
One is left with a conclusion that would certainly make the godfather of
purchasing power parity, Gustav Cassel, roll over in his grave.  It is simply this:
International goods markets, though becoming more integrated all the time, remain quite
segmented, with large trading frictions across a broad range of goods.  These frictions
may be due to transportation costs, threatened or actual tariffs, nontariff barriers,
information costs or lack of labor mobility.  As a consequence of various adjustment
costs, there is a large buffer within which nominal exchange rates can move without
producing an immediate proportional response in relative domestic prices.  International
goods markets are highly integrated, but not yet nearly as integrated as domestic goods
markets.  This is not an entirely comfortable conclusion, but for now there is no really
satisfactory alternative explanation to the purchasing power parity puzzle.  (p. 667-668.)
Perhaps, in addition, when these frictions are present, there is more scope for
herding behavior and bubbles.  It is unlikely that a fully-specified model would take as
simple a form as the one posited here.  But bubbles and herding behavior might
temporarily send the exchange rate off on disequilibrium paths that result in the
appearance of slow convergence to the equilibrium.  It is suggestive to note that our
empirical model of exchange rates is consistent with the RESP model except in one
respect: it implies uncovered interest parity will not hold.  (See Appendix 1.)
The failure of uncovered interest parity is, in itself, a puzzle.  The ex post change23
in the exchange rate is consistently opposite of the expected change implied by relative
interest rates under uncovered interest parity.  The literature has been strikingly incapable
of explaining this failure (known as the “forward premium puzzle”) by appealing to
models of the foreign exchange risk premium.
8  On the other hand, Frankel and Froot
(1987, 1990) argue that the forward premium puzzle is consistent with a model in which
noise traders follow bandwagon behavior: buying a currency if it appreciated in the
previous period, for example.  This type of bandwagon speculation conceivably could
also be responsible for the very slow adjustment of nominal exchange rates to their
equilibrium level.
                                               
8   See the surveys of Hodrick (1987) and Engel (1996).24
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Appendix 1
The purpose of this appendix is to derive the behavior of real exchange-rate
adjustment from a RESP model.  The derivation helps understand the implicit restrictions
that are usually put on price and exchange-rate changes, and where we differ.
Start with money demand equations in the home and foreign country, and interest
parity (all constant terms will be suppressed for simplicity):
t t t i p u l - = - (A1.1)
* * * *
t t t i p u l - = - (A1.2)
t t t t t s s E i i - = - + ) ( 1
* . (A1.3)
Here,  t u  ( )
*
t u  is the log of the money supply less money demand shifters in the home
(foreign) country, and  t i  (
*
t i ) is the home (foreign interest rate.)
We define the equilibrium price,  t p  (
*
t p ) as the level that  t p  (
*
t p ) would equal
given current value of  t u  ( )
*
t u .  Under flexible prices, real interest rates are assumed
constant, so nominal interest rates are assumed to equal the expected rate of inflation
(plus a constant.)
) ) ( ( 1 t t t t t p p E p u - - = - + l (A1.4)




t t t t t p p E p u - - = - + l (A1.5)
Each of (A1.4) and (A1.5) are univariate rational expectations difference27
equations.  They have solutions of the form:
t t u L A p ) ( = (A1.6)
* * * ) ( t t u L A p = (A1.7)
Here  ) (L A  ( ) (
* L A ) is the lag-operator on money supply and money demand shocks in
the home (foreign) country that solves equation (A1.4) (equation (A1.5)).
As in Engel and Frankel (1984), we posit that nominal prices in each country
adjust slowly toward their equilibrium levels.  But, we make two adjustments.  First, only
a fraction d  of prices are sticky.  A fraction  d - 1  adjust instantaneously.  (In the foreign
country, a fraction 
* d  of prices are sticky.)  Second, we allow a purely transitory shock
to hit prices, so that even when  1 = d  there can be some deviation of the actual price level
from its expected level:







* * * * * *
1 ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( + + + + + - - + + - - = - t t t t t t t t t p p p E p p p p e d d q (A1.9)
Prices each period adjust part of the way toward their equilibrium value, under the
assumptions:  1 0 < <q  and  1 0
* < <q .  There are also terms that account for drift in the
equilibrium prices.







* 1 t t t t t t t u p u p s s E - - - + = + l l
(A1.10)28
If long-run PPP holds, so 
*







* 1 t t t t t t t u p u p s s E - - - + = + l l
(A1.11)





) ( ) (
* *
* 1 1 t t t t t t t t t t p p p p s s s E s E - - - + - = - + + l l
(A1.12)
Equations (A1.8), (A1.9) and (A1.12) can be written in matrix form as a three-
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Inspection of equation (A1.14) shows that imposing the condition that the system
be expected to converge to the steady state requires  0 = t z .  This is an important property
of the RESP model, and the key difference between our model and the RESP model: that29
model makes  t t s s -  be a linear combination of  t t p p -  and 
* *
t t p p - .  This is the
requirement that the economy be on a stable saddle path.  Our model does not impose
that.  As we discuss further below, our model is fundamentally different than the RESP
model, even the version of the RESP model in which 
* q q „ .
If 
* q q „ , we will be unable to represent the dynamics of the real exchange rate
only in terms of lagged values of the real exchange rate, because domestic and foreign
prices converge at different speeds.  But, if 
* q q =  and 
* l l = , we can use equations
(A1.12), (A1.15) and the condition that  0 = t z  to get:
) )( 1 ( ) ( 1 1 t t t t t s s s s E - - = - + + q (A1.16)
Equations (A1.8), (A1.9) and (A1.16) show that domestic prices, foreign prices and the
exchange rate all converge at the same speed (in expectations) when 
* q q =  and 
* l l = .
Defining the real exchange rate as  t t t t p p s q - + ”
* , we have:
) )( 1 ( ) ( 1 1 t t t t t q q q q E - - = - + + q .
It may seem that merely relaxing the assumption of 
* q q =  and 
* l l =  yields a
model in which domestic prices, foreign prices and exchange rates converge at different
speeds.  Clearly in this case, domestic prices converge at a rate of q  and foreign prices
converge at the rate 
* q .  The exchange rate equation could be written, for example, as:
) )( 1 (
1
) )( 1 ( ) (
* *




However, there is no unique way to write the exchange rate equation, because the30
condition that  0 = t z  implies that  t t s s -  is a linear combination of  t t p p -  and 
* *
t t p p - .
That is, there are only two independent equations in the dynamic system (whether or not
* q q = ) in the RESP model.  The reduced dimension of the system is a result of the
requirement that is imposed that the system converges to steady state.  The exchange rate
must jump in response to shocks so it is on the path that leads to the steady state.
So, our model can be thought of as generalizing the RESP model in two ways: we
do not require that prices in both countries and the exchange rate converge at the same
speed, and we allow for three independent equations for  t t s s -  ,  t t p p - , and 
* *
t t p p - .
To write the system of stochastic equations implied by the RESP model, note
1 0 1 1 ) ( + + + = - t t t t u A p E p , (A1.17)








1 ) ( + + + = - t t t t u A p E p . (A1.18)




1 + + - t t p p :







* * * *
1
*
1 ) )( 1 ( + + + + + - - - = - t t t t t t u A p p p p e d q .
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1 * * 1 1
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t v v v
q l lq
. (A1.19)
Define  lq k / 1 ”  and 
* * * / 1 q l k ” .  Then we can write the covariance matrix
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s s k d s d
s dks ds
s k d dks s k s k s k ks
s d s k s
ds ks s
(A1.20)
In equation (A20), there are only eight independent elements to estimate: d , 
* d , k , 
* k ,
2
v s , 
2
* v s , 
2
v s , and 
2
* v s .  Of course, the usual restriction that the lower and upper
triangles be identical reduces the dimension of the matrix to fifteen.  There are four
additional zero restrictions that reduce the dimension to eleven.  The other three
restrictions come about because of the saddle-path restriction in equation (A19).  Without
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* d d = , and 
* k k = , then we can derive the restrictions in equations (9) – (11).32
Finally, as noted in the conclusions section, if we retain all of the equations of the
RESP model (equations (A1.1), (A1.2), (A1.4)-(A1.9)), but do not assume uncovered
interest parity (A1.3) and instead assume that exchange rates adjust to equilibrium at
some rate  z - 1 :
st t t t t v s s s s + - - = - + + ) )( 1 ( 1 1 z ,
we can solve to find that the uncovered interest parity condition does not hold:








1 t t t t t t t t t t t s s p p p p i i s s E - - - + - - - = - + z
l l
. (A1.22)33
  Appendix 2
For estimation given the restrictions, we cast the model in state-space form and
apply the Kalman filter and maximum likelihood based upon the prediction error
decomposition as discussed in Harvey (1990). The state equation, which represents the
evolution of the unobserved components, is
t t t v F ~ ~




























0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0













































































































































Note that the covariance matrix for  t v ~ , denoted  ] ~ ~ [ t tv v E Q ¢ ” , is a simple linear
transformation of (7¢). Meanwhile, the observation equation, which relates the price
levels and exchange rate to their unobserved components, is34
























































0 1 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1
H .
The inclusion of a separate initial value for the equilibrium exchange rate corresponds to
relative, rather than absolute, PPP.
9 Meanwhile, we include initial values for the
equilibrium price levels in A to address the lack of appropriate startup values for the
Kalman filter. In particular, equilibrium prices follow unit root processes that have no
unconditional expected values. By including initial values in estimation here, we are able
to normalize the corresponding initial state variables to zero. Then, we estimate
equilibrium prices by adding the estimated initial values to the filter output.
10
The Kalman filter for this state-space model is given by the following six
equations:
b m b t t t t F | |
~
- - - = + 1 1 1 (A2.3)
P FP F Q t t t t | | - - - = ¢+ 1 1 1 (A2.4)
h b t t t t t y H | | - - = - 1 1 (A2.5)
f HP H t t t t | | - - = ¢ 1 1 (A2.6)
b b h t t t t t t t K | | | = + - - 1 1 (A2.7)
P P K HP t t t t t t t | | | = - - - 1 1 (A2.8)
                                               
9 Since price data is in index form, only relative PPP is tenable.
10 An alternative approach would be to make an arbitrary guess about the corresponding Kalman filter
startup values and assign our guess an extremely large variance.35
where  ] [ 1 1 | t t t t E b b - - ” , for example, denotes the expectation of bt  conditional on
information up to time t -1;  Pt t | -1 is the variance-covariance of bt t | -1; ht t | -1 is a vector of
the conditional forecast errors of the observed series;  ft t | -1 is the variance-covariance of
ht t | -1; and  K P H f t t t t t ” ¢ - -
-
| | 1 1
1  is the Kalman gain.
Given arbitrary initial parameter estimates and initial values b0 0 |  and  P 0 0 |  based
on unconditional expected values and the normalizations discussed above, we solve
equations (A2.3)-(A2.8) recursively for t T =1,...,  to obtain filtered inferences about bt
conditional on information up to time t.
Then, as a by-product of the Kalman filter, we obtain ht t | -1 and  ft t | -1, which allow
us to calculate maximum likelihood estimates of the various parameters based on the
prediction error decomposition (Harvey, 1990):
max ( ) ln(( ) | |) | | | | q q p h h l f f t t
t
T
t t t t t t
t
T


























where q  is the vector of parameters.36
Table 1
Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Country Pairs
Parameter US/Canada US/France US/Germany US/Italy US/Japan US/UK
* =
p p f f 0.273 0.478 0.480 0.681 0.641 0.569
(0.201) (0.128) (0.114) (0.244) (0.163) (0.120)
s f 0.987 0.942 0.928 0.927 0.958 0.919
(0.015) (0.033) (0.032) (0.034) (0.022) (0.038)
* =
p p f f 0.955 0.965 0.926 0.938 0.962 0.935
(0.026) (0.020) (0.029) (0.028) (0.019) (0.030)
p s 0.430 0.397 0.358 0.421 0.421 0.327
(0.059) (0.050) (0.059) (0.069) (0.078) (0.039)
* p s 0.365 0.235 0.396 0.359 0.497 0.783
(0.058) (0.037) (0.049) (0.100) (0.068) (0.032)
s s 2.193 5.612 5.900 5.435 6.191 5.265
(0.158) (0.423) (0.426) (0.398) (0.489) (0.389)
p s 0.230 0.263 0.295 0.276 0.252 0.324
(0.039) (0.042) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.036)
* p s 0.267 0.268 0.212 0.527 0.299 0.535
(0.060) (0.042) (0.046) (0.103) (0.055) (0.021)37
Table 1 (Continued)
Parameter US/Canada US/France US/Germany US/Italy US/Japan US/UK
g -0.286 5.776 2.285 3.036 7.319 -0.344
(0.848) (3.199) (4.355) (1.846) (4.929) (1.771)
d 1.364 -0.815 -1.171 -0.613 -1.049 -1.009
(0.433) (0.245) (0.288) (0.251) (0.297) (0.179)
k -0.023 1.576 2.205 2.066 3.778 1.007
(0.093) (2.286) (2.066) (1.577) (1.370) (0.863)
m 1.296 1.356 1.331 1.318 1.339 1.338
(0.442) (0.616) (0.363) (0.396) (0.552) (0.447)
* m 1.454 1.621 0.793 2.407 1.162 2.141
(0.512) (0.583) (0.262) (0.754) (0.636) (0.748)
1 - p 355.708 355.352 355.055 355.424 355.187 354.854
(0.986) (1.055) (1.084) (1.202) (1.172) (1.130)
*
-1 p 341.769 327.646 401.216 259.346 386.152 293.145
(1.006) (0.851) (0.913) (1.680) (1.358) (2.155)
1 - s -12.435 -153.173 -103.242 -637.282 -539.337 104.327
(10.891) (8.493) (7.479) (6.925) (12.479) (6.338)
Log likelihood -404.190 -478.424 -502.276 -532.126 -529.959 -566.353
Note: Standard Errors are reported in parentheses.38
Table 2
Likelihood Ratio Test of Same vs. Different Speeds of Adjustment I
Country Pair ) 1 (








s p p H f f f = = * : 0  vs. 
s p p H f f f „ = * : 1 .39
Table 3
Likelihood Ratio Test of First- vs. Second-Order Autoregressive Adjustment
Processes
Country Pair ) 3 (







Note:  1 : 0 = k H  vs.  2 : 1 = k H .40
Table 4
Likelihood Ratio Test of Same vs. Different Speeds of Adjustment II
Country Pair ) 2 (








s p p s p p H , 2 , 2 , 2 , 1 , 1 , 1 0 , : f f f f f f = = = = * *  vs. 
s p p s p p H , 2 , 2 , 2 , 1 , 1 , 1 1 , : f f f f f f „ = „ = * * .41
Table 5
Likelihood Ratio Test of Zero Restrictions vs. Unrestricted Covariance Matrix
Country Pair ) 4 (







Note:  0 :
, , , , 0 = = = = * * * * p p p p p p p p H s s s s  vs.
0 , 0 , 0 , 0 :
, , , , 1 „ „ „ „ * * * * p p p p p p p p H s s s s .42
Table 6
Likelihood Ratio Test of Same vs. Different Speeds of Adjustment III
Country Pair ) 2 (








s p p H f f f = = * : 0  vs. 
s p p H f f f „ „ * : 1 .43
Table 7
Likelihood Ratio Test of Symmetry Restrictions vs. No Symmetry Restrictions
Country Pair ) 5 (



































































































f f f f .44
Table 8
Likelihood Ratio Test of Independent Shocks vs. Reported Model
Country Pair ) 3 (







Note:  0 : 0 = = = g d a H  vs.  0 , 0 , 0 : 1 „ „ „ g d a H .